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THE ECONOMIC BACKGROUND 
The upturn in the growth of the world economy, 
which commenced in 1991, has continued unabated 
through 1994 and it seems set fair to continue into 
1995, and beyond. For example, recent calculations 
by the International Monetary Fund (in their World 
Economic Outlook) suggest that the overall growth 
in world output will be 3 per cent in 1994, while 
their projections for 1995 are for a growth rate of 
3.5 per cent, double the rate of 1990-1993. 
Furthermore, it is anticipated that the world 
economy will recover its average 1970-93 growth 
rate in the final quarter of 1994. 
With economics being regarded as the dismal 
science, economists are usually quick to point out 
that the benefits of rapid economic growth are 
bought at a cost of rising inflation. This certainly 
has been the pattern in previous recoveries. The 
present recovery seems to be an exception in this 
regard, since the only major inflationary pressures 
in the world economy this year have been confined 
to commodity price inflation (often seen as a good 
leading indicator of inflationary pressures) and not 
to any great extent in producer/ consumer price 
inflation. Thus, the overall US dollar commodity 
price index exhibited a 37.3 per cent year-on-year 
change from October 1993 to October 1994, while 
the corresponding industrial country inflation 
average was a modest 2 per cent. In large measure 
this reflects the fact that although 1994 is the year 
in which industrial country growth again became 
synchronised across countries, countries are at 
different stages in their recovery - some like the US 
reaching full capacity, whilst others like Germany 
only emerging from recession for the first time in 
1994. 
The fact that the key industrial countries are at 
different stages in the upturn has helped prevent 
inflationary pressures taking off in 1994. Another 
reason why the current world recovery has not so 
far been inflationary is the very large debt overhang 
from the 1980s boom which has helped to curb 
consumer spending, an important component of 
aggregate demand. The combination of relatively 
rapid world economic growth and low inflation 
seems most desirable. How long though is it 
sustainable? In this article we argue that it is 
potentially sustainable through into 1995 and 
perhaps beyond; however, there are some worrying 
trends in the world economy and these may need 
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careful monitoring in 1995 if the golden 
combination' of growth and low inflation is to be 
maintained. 
In this last quarter review of the world economy, 
we take the opportunity to summarise the position 
of four key players in the world economy during 
1994 and how we expect them to perform in 1995. 
Our main emphasis is on the US economy. This is 
because although the US trading position does not 
dominate European trade its impact on world 
financial markets is still extremely important and, 
indeed, developments in US financial markets in 
1995 could well have an important bearing on the 
level of interest rates in Europe and hence the 
stance of European macroeconomic policy. 
The United States 
The US recovery, one of the earliest industrial 
country recoveries, is now at, or close to, its peak, 
this being reflected in the fact that full capacity 
utilisation has now been achieved. There are now, 
therefore, very real signs of inflationary pressure 
building up in the US, and this may be illustrated in 
at least three ways. First, the recent trend in actual 
inflation has been upwards. For example, the US 
producer price index rose from a zero value in June 
of this year to an annualised rate of 1 per cent in 
the quarter ending in October; consumer prices rose 
faster than producer prices to an annualised rate of 
2.6 per cent in October 1994. Inflation based on the 
consumer price index is projected to rise to an 
annualised rate of 3.3 per cent in 1995. 
The second indication of inflationary pressures is to 
be found in long bond yields, traditionally a good 
leading indicator of inflationary expectations. The 
yield on long term government debt is traditionally 
decomposed into expected real and inflationary 
components (the idea being that investors have 
some notional expected real rate and want to be 
compensated, by a rise in the nominal rate when 
expected inflation increases). Yields on long term 
US government stock have risen from around 6 per 
cent in June 1994 to 8 per cent at the time of 
writing, thus suggesting a fairly dramatic upward 
revision in inflationary expectations (although this 
could, in part, reflect a rise in the real rate of 
interest due to the relative tightness in the real 
sector, the depreciation in the external value of the 
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US dollar during the period suggests otherwise). 
Subtracting the actual inflation rate from the long 
bond yield suggests a real rate of interest of 5.4 per 
cent which is too high by historical standards (it 
should be around 2 to 3 per cent) and this therefore 
indicates that it is the expected inflation rate that 
has risen; indeed, the fall in the external value of 
the dollar is consistent with this. 
A further indicator of potentially higher US 
inflation may be gleaned from the US fiscal 
position. Although the US authorities have had 
some success in reducing the fiscal deficit over the 
last couple of years, the recent successes that the 
Republicans have scored in the mid-term elections 
may result in tax cuts and this, combined with a 
reluctance to cut government spending, could well 
result in a budgetary blow-out (prior to these 
elections the International Monetary Fund, in its 
World Economic Outlook, had already advocated 
further controlled reductions in the government 
debt-GDP ratio). This may therefore be a portent of 
further inflation with the uncertainty associated with 
this. An increased fiscal deficit may also further 
exacerbate the already large US trade deficit which 
has been one of the key problem areas for the 
world economy. To the extent that the trade deficit 
does worsen in the future this will have further 
important inflationary ramifications for the world 
economy as the other OECD and, indeed far eastern 
suppliers, start to reach binding supply constraints. 
Given the pivotal role the US plays in the world 
economy, the upward revision of inflationary 
expectations, and the interest rate increases 
associated with it, is worrisome for at least two 
reasons. First, there is the traditional expenditure 
reducing effects of higher interest rates which may 
trip the US economy into recession mode, with the 
consequences this may have for world trade. 
Second, an upward revision of the inflation rate 
imparts increased uncertainty into international 
financial markets. This is revealed, in particular, by 
the cat-and-mouse game played by the Federal 
Reserve in attempting to keep a lid on inflation, and 
inflationary expectations, and the consequences this 
has had for world bond and stock markets. Thus the 
rise in the Fed Funds rate in November resulted in 
a sharp fall in the US stock market which was 
rapidly transmitted to other countries through the 
so-called contagion effect. Such sharp stock market 
adjustments do not impart a particularly confident 
air into the business environment and although this 
stock market correction reduced the bond/equity 
yield from 2.8 to 2.7 per cent it is still rather high 
on an historical basis, suggesting that a further 
correction(s) is in the pipeline in the future (the 
normal range is 2.4 to 2.6 per cent). Whether short 
term US interest rates have now risen enough to 
dispel inflationary worries is doubtful. 
Since continued rises in short interest rates seem to 
be expected by financial markets it is likely that US 
growth will moderate in 1995 to around 2.5 per 
cent, from the predicted 3.75 per cent for the 
overall 1994 position. 
Germany 
The prediction of Germany's five wise men in 1993, 
that overall economic growth in 1994 would be 
zero, has been proved wrong since the country 
looks like producing a respectable 2.5 per cent 
growth rate for the current year; thus proving the 
rule that forecasting is an especially hazardous 
occupation! This growth led to a slight fall in the 
jobless total from 8.7 per cent of the work force at 
the beginning of the year to around 8.0 by October. 
The expected growth rate for German GDP in 1995 
is around 2.7 per cent. The improved German 
economic growth performance has been generated 
by a combination of export-led growth, residential 
construction and stock building. The potential 
buoyancy of the German economy for the coming 
year should help to attenuate the effect on world 
economic growth next year of any relative 
slowdown in the US economy. 
Much of the improved real economic performance 
has been aided by the fairly dramatic easing of the 
stance of monetary policy, particularly at the turn of 
the year when the annualised rate of change of the 
M3 definition of the money supply was above 20 
per cent, an unheard of increase for the recent past. 
The Bundesbank's clear commitment to achieving 
its monetary/ low inflation targets (the inflation 
target for 1995 is 2 per cent) means that short term 
interest rates have risen during the year and are 
unlikely to fall any further for the foreseeable 
future. The Bundesbank's tightening of monetary 
policy has resulted in the annualised growth of M3 
to October being 6.9 per cent, which is only slightly 
outside the governments target range of 4 to 6 per 
cent. As the recovery gathers momentum next year, 
there may in fact be pressures to increase interest 
rates in much the same way as has occurred in the 
US. 
Part of the German strategy of controlling inflation 
has been the control of the government deficit as a 
proportion of GDP, which has fallen to 2.5 per cent 
of GDP in 1994 and is expected to fall further in 
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1995 with planned tax rises. However, given that 
the German recovery seems so strongly rooted, it is 
unlikely that this will affect economic growth next 
year. 
Japan 
Like the German economy, the Japanese economy 
in 1994 has shown clear signs of an economic 
turnaround, although this is still rather fragile. The 
Japanese recovery may be gauged in a variety of 
ways. For example, the OECD's composite leading 
indicator, which fell in 1993, has been rising 
steadily in every quarter of this year (this indicator 
is reinforced by the upward rise in the Japanese 
official index of current business conditions). Also, 
the fall in Japan's external trade surplus, which 
shrank by 15.2 per cent in October 1994 compared 
to October 1993, indicates relatively buoyant 
domestic demand; although the relative strength of 
the yen and a perhaps more fundamental 
reorientation of Japan's trading patterns are also 
likely to be important factors. In contrast to 
previous quarters, industrial production became 
positive in the third quarter of 1994 (+1.6 per cent 
compared to an average of -2.8 over the previous 
three quarters). Unemployment seems to have 
levelled of in the third quarter at around 2.7 per 
cent. The fragility of the recovery may be gauged 
from the fact that consumer price inflation is almost 
zero whilst producer price inflation is still around 
minus 2 per cent. 
The fragility of the Japanese recovery has not 
deterred the Bank of Japan from gradually raising 
short term interest rates this year (from 2 per cent 
in July to 2.3 per cent in November), the intention 
being to ensure that the necessary restructuring of 
the economy, necessitated by the overexpansion in 
the 1980s, is maintained. The yield gap between 
long and short term Japanese government debt is 
positive at around 2.3 per cent, which is a reflection 
of US bond market developments (see above) rather 
than a portent of increased Japanese inflation. 
France 
French economic growth also became firmly 
established in 1994 illustrated by the fact that 
industrial production became marginally positive in 
the first quarter of 1994 (to 0.4 per cent) and rose 
to 4.9 per cent by the third quarter. Overall GDP 
growth is expected to be around 2 per cent in 1994, 
rising to 3 per cent in 1995. The recovery in real 
output has led to a stabilisation of the 
unemployment level at around 12.5 per cent, but the 
largely structural nature of unemployment means it 
is unlikely that the expected improved economic 
performance next year will make much impact on 
the unemployment total. Inflation is relatively low, 
expected to be 1.7 per cent in total for 1994, rising 
to 2 per cent in 1995. Although the recovery in 
France has been aided by a loosening of monetary 
policy, interest rate levels have still remained 
relatively high given the low inflation rate: short 
term rates are 5.55 and long rates are around 8 per 
cent, again the latter being driven largely by 
developments in the US. The relatively high French 
interest rates will help to ensure that inflation is 
strictly controlled during 1995. 
Concluding Comments 
In sum, the world economic recovery became 
firmly established in 1994 and this will continue 
through 1995 and beyond. It is likely that the 
inflationary dragon will remain slain in 1995, 
although, as we have pointed out, there are some 
concerns about the implications of certain US 
developments for international financial markets and 
international trade. In particular, the fact the US 
economy is now beginning to overheat will keep 
US long bond yields relatively high and this, in 
turn, will feed through into other industrial country 
bond yields, which will also remain high in 1995. 
Given the relatively low inflation forecast for next 
year these relatively high real yields could have a 
negative effect on expenditure and thereby 
attenuate the world economic recovery somewhat. 
A further danger of the relatively high bond yields 
is that corrections in the bond-equity yield ratio 
could again spark a decline in world equity markets 
and corresponding corrections at the short end of 
the interest rate spectrum. Also there is likely to be 
further upward pressure in short term interest rates 
as the recovery takes a firmer grip in the European 
countries and in Japan. 
In terms of exchange rate levels, the fundamentals 
portrayed in this review suggest that they will be 
relatively stable. The dollar, for example, is 
expected to stabilise in 1995 and may even show a 
modest appreciation. The long term appreciation of 
the yen will probably continue, although there may 
well be some short term correction if capital 
outflows resume. We can expect continued relative 
stability of the European currencies in the coming 
year and, perhaps, a slight appreciation of sterling 
against its European neighbours given the 
favourable current account/ inflation position. 
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